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Abstract 
This article is a very brief version of a 320 page book based on sources and publications in 
English, Greek, French and German from all countries which were involved in the Battle for 
Crete during the Second World War. It analyses and explains the reasons why the defenders 
lost despite information provided by ULTRA about the plans of the attackers and both far 
higher numbers and heavy weapons. 
 
Introductory Remarks  
In 1972 I published my first book on Greece in World War II covering the period 1936 to 
1946. The book contained several chapters dealing with the Greek-Italian war in the winter of 
1940 and a lengthy one describing the German attack against Greece in the spring of 1941 
(Operation Marita), with only a few paragraphs referring to the invasion of Crete, Operation 
Mercury (Merkur). The main weight of the book, however, was on the resistance during the 
occupation.1
  
In the 1990s I returned to the topic because I noticed that, while there were many 
historical accounts of the attack on Greece, they were presented according to the national 
standpoint of the various participants. The content of most books was restricted by the 
respective nationalities of the authors and there was no comprehensive description of the 
events based on all available material. Thus I decided to write an account including all 
publications in English, Greek, Italian, French and German. The result was a volume of over 
500 pages dealing with the period from August 1940 to June 1941.2
  
 While writing this volume I concluded that Operation Mercury deserved a book of its 
own and my work followed the same pattern. Thus the book is based on primary sources 
printed in English, Greek and German and on secondary prints from Britain, New Zealand, 
Australia, USA, Greece, France, Austria and Germany. This book is the first account based on 
the contributions in the various languages of all former participants. It appeared in 2011.3 The 
present article is a brief adaption of this 400 page volume. Readers originating from the 
countries involved will encounter well known facts and interpretations from their national 
point of view but this applies for all sides. Nevertheless, I am sure that each reader will 
discover some new things. Of course, many observations and statements are rather brief, but 
this article is a resumé of a big work.  
 
Preliminaries  
When on 28 October 1940 Mussolini attacked Greece, Churchill and Hitler made statements 
showing that both had understood the strategic importance of Crete. However, the real 
military value of Crete was of a rather theoretical nature at that time. The German side might 
have wanted to use Crete to influence developments in the Near East by attacks of its air force 
(Luftwaffe) in accordance with the ideas developed by the leaders of the navy and air force, 
but Hitler was fixed on Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of the Soviet Union. Similarly, 
the British might have used Crete to attack the Romanian oilfields which were most important 
for the German war effort, if suitable long range bomber planes had been available in the Near 
East.  
 With Hitler otherwise occupied, Churchill ordered the first defence measures to be 
taken for Crete, although he soon forgot to ensure their realization. Therefore, almost nothing 
was done in Crete during the following six months. When after the fiasco in Greece in April 
1941 criticism began in Britain, Churchill looked for an opportunity to inflict a heavy blow on 
Hitler, so that the defeat in Greece would be forgotten.4 When towards the end of April the 
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code breakers in Bletchley Park (Ultra), who had broken the Luftwaffe wireless code, 
informed Churchill that the Germans planned to conquer Crete from the air, he saw his 
opportunity for retaliation.5 Without Churchill’s insistence, Crete, like all other Greek islands, 
would have fallen into German hands without any fighting. 
 Militarily speaking, the battle for Crete was a senseless enterprise for the British side. If 
they had succeeded in holding Crete, they would have been obliged to keep a strong garrison 
there. As Crete was not self-supporting, they would have been compelled to supply the 
soldiers and the civilian population which undoubtedly would have led to heavy losses of 
transport ships. In other words, the British would have encountered the same situation as the 
Germans after their victory in Crete.  
 
Preparations and planning  
Once the decisions for the conquest of Crete were taken, both sides hectically prepared 
themselves for the clash; improvising was the main planning characteristic. Since there were 
no fresh troops in the Near East, the British Commander-in-Chief there, General Wavell, was 
forced to use troops which had just been evacuated from Greece and had lost all their heavy 
weapons and most means of transport and communication. The few heavy guns available in 
Crete were of Italian origin, recently captured in North Africa, and the small number of tanks 
were barely operational. Supplies had to come over the sea from Egypt, and since the 
evacuation of Greece it had become clear that the ships could unload only during nighttime 
because in daylight the Luftwaffe controlled the sky above the Aegean.6
 
 
 The problems of the German side were equally grave. Within a few weeks the airborne 
and parachutist units had to be transferred to Greece without obstructing the deployment of 
Operation Barbarossa which was already beginning. At the same time the infrastructure 
necessary for an airborne operation had to be created in Greece. The operations of two totally 
distinct Luftwaffe corps (the airborne corps and the combat plane corps) and a huge air 
transport fleet had to be coordinated by the command of Air Fleet 4 (Luftflotte 4), and after 
the landing the fighting had to be coordinated. This made high demands on the leadership, 
which could not always be lived up to by the Luftwaffe because there were no previous 
models for airborne operations on a strategic level. Operation Mercury was a strategic terra 
nova.  
 German supplies could be brought to Crete by air and by sea. However, the first only 
allowed the transport of light weapons and motorcycles. Heavy weapons and means of 
transport had to be brought by sea, but the Kriegsmarine (Navy) did not have even a single 
appropriate vessel in the Aegean. Therefore, kaïkis (fishing boats with a weak motor) had to 
be used and these could sail only during daytime, since at night the Royal Navy ruled the sea.  
 The operational concept of the defenders was clear and simple: the three airfields and 
the harbour in Souda Bay would be defended against seaborne and airborne attacks. Looking 
at General Student’s original plan of attack one can only shake one’s head. Obviously, 
Student had not understood that simple military logic would lead the adversary to expect the 
aerial attack precisely at these sites and that he would take the necessary precautions which 
would lead to heavy German losses. The proposal of Luftflotte 4 to drop the airborne troops 
over an unoccupied area was absolutely right. It should have been clear to Student that the 
adversary would discover the preparations of this great strategic deployment simply by using 
reconnaissance aircraft. Thus the element of surprise, the most important element of an 
airborne attack, would be lost. Crete was much too big for Student’s often praised ‘oil spill 
tactics’ (Ölflecktaktik), according to which as many attacks as possible occur on different 
places simultaneously and then merge during the fighting.7
 
 
 The short time for the preparation led to deficiencies in the personal equipment of the 
airborne troops. Their uniforms and their food had been designed for Norway and were totally 
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unsuitable for the Cretan heat. The separate dropping of men and equipment proved to be 
fatal. Parachutists carried on them a pistol, a knife and a few hand grenades. All other 
equipment was dropped separately in containers and had to be fetched, a deadly undertaking 
under fire.  
 
Reconnaissance  
German reconnaissance was a total failure. Rarely in military history had an operation begun 
in such absolute ignorance. Luftflotte 4 and 12th Army were responsible. The chief of the 
Abwehr (counterintelligence) was not involved at all.8
 
On the British side the most detailed 
information about German plans was supplied by ULTRA. But it appears that the Allied 
commander on Crete, Bernard Freyberg, had not been informed of the real identity of ULTRA 
and the reliability of the information obtained. According to historian Antony Beevor, 
Freyberg had been told that the information stemmed from an agent.9 Consequently, Freyberg 
did not fully trust the information and relied on his experience of Gallipoli, and this told him 
that the attack on Crete would be of an amphibious nature, and he deployed his forces 
accordingly. A big part of these forces was guarding the shores.  
 
Leadership  
The Germans directed the battle from Athens, the Allies from Cairo. In Athens Luftflotte 4 
had the overall command of forces deployed by the air force, army and navy. The 
commanders-in-chief of these three forces were not in Athens and Berlin did not interfere in 
the actual operation. Hitler’s only intervention was his order not to send airborne troops alone 
but to also add seaborne units. These were transported by kaïkis and they were sunk by the 
Royal Navy on the night of 21 May. On British side, in contrast, there existed three 
independent high commands of the army, navy and air force. The three commanders-in-chief 
had individual contacts to the War Cabinet via their related ministries, which in turn gave 
orders separately via the three chains of command. Additionally, Churchill constantly 
interfered in the decision-making process in Cairo. Thus independent actions and decision, 
made according to the local situation, were rather reduced.  
 Freyberg had understood that in view of the great distances between the four places of 
attack and the miserable communication system he could not lead the battle centrally. He had 
to convey responsibility to the four local brigade commanders who would be obliged to act 
independently. This functioned well at Irakleion, Rethymnon and Chania/Galatas, but at the 
decisive point Freyberg conferred the command to two commanders who were unqualified for 
this task and too old. Brigadier Hargest who was going to defend Maleme was a politician by 
profession and the New Zealand divisional commander Puttick thought in World War I 
categories. Freyberg did not understand that the impending battle needed a dynamic defence, 
not a static one as had been practiced in World War I.  
 When deploying his forces on the four landing grounds of the airborne attack, Freyberg 
made no capital mistake except in the case of Maleme. Accordingly, the parachutists did not 
succeed with their attacks in the other three places, and they had to change over to a hedgehog 
position (an all around defence) and without outside help they would have been forced to 
surrender sooner or later. But at Maleme the west bank of the Tavronitis river and the heights 
west of it were not occupied, thus enabling the German 2nd Battalion and parts of the 4th 
Battalion to land without any losses, collect their weapons and go over to the attack. Had 
these areas been occupied there would have been a similar development to the other three 
places. A dislodging of the adversary from Maleme airfield would have been impossible. 
Another decisive mistake was not to destroy the runway thoroughly by blasting big holes in it. 
But the RAF was against this because they hoped they could use it again and insisted that only 
removable obstacles were put on the runway. Had it been ruined effectively no transport 
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planes could have landed. But the decisive mistake which triggered the defeat was the non-
occupation of the heights west of the Tavronitis. The fact that Freyberg  did not insist that this 
dangerous gap be closed may be characterized as a catastrophic failure. Adding to this 
judgement is that there was a whole Greek regiment available at Castelli which could have 
been brought there in time.10
 
 
 The attempt of most of the Allied commanders to lead the battle from the rear as they 
had done in World War I also led to catastrophes because there were not enough wireless sets 
and the Cretan telephone network broke down with the first bombing attack. The 
telecommunications equipment of the New Zealand Division had been transported to Egypt. 
Thus Freyberg had to rely upon the few wireless sets of the battalions. There were battalions 
which had only one radio set. The defenders of Rethymnon had four telephones and one 
wireless set. Often commanders, as in World War I, had to rely upon runners.11
 
 
 But the German concept of leadership was equally problematical: Nominally Operation 
Mercury was commanded by General Löhr of Luftflotte 4 in Athens, but he left the real 
control to Student. Luftflotte 4 had already packed up its powerful wireless stations and sent 
them northward to its deployment area for Barbarossa. Therefore communication between 
Athens and Crete had to be improvised with weaker wireless sets. Thus communication 
between Athens and the four battle places was problematical. Often the wireless sets of the 
airborne troops were smashed on landing.  
 
The strength of the forces  
It was clear that at the beginning of the battle the defenders would be stronger not only by 
numbers but also principally because in modern battles with mechanized weaponry the 
defender is always stronger than the attacker. Thus the Cretan defenders had a good chance to 
beat the aggressors. But although this numerical superiority applied for the island as a whole, 
locally it was only conditionally correct. There were British battalions which did not come 
into operation during the first critical phase because they were waiting at the coast for the 
German amphibious invasion. At another spot, Maleme, one battalion had to bear the brunt of 
the fighting. There were units which were composed of all sorts of troops, some of which had 
only basic infantry training. Gunners had almost no infantry weapons. Such units were good 
in static defence but they did not have any experience in mobile warfare.  
 The often heard contention that the defenders had heavy weapons is only conditionally 
right. In reality Freyberg’s troops had some artillery of Italian origin and a few barely 
operational tanks.12 But as the defenders did not have traction engines, shifting positions was 
difficult. It was even more risky during the daytime because of the omnipresent planes of the 
Luftwaffe. The heavy trench mortars of the parachutists were mobile and in an infantry battle 
they were superior to the Italian guns.  
 The decisive factor was the Luftwaffe. The RAF could not make a stand against it 
because there were no modern planes either in Crete or in the Near East. At most, it could 
interfere but not really influence the battle. At night, the Royal Navy controlled the sea but 
during the day it was threatened by the Luftwaffe. The German navy had not one warship in 
the Aegean.  
 
The battle  
The German attack had to be executed in two waves because there were not enough transport 
planes for a simultaneous attack on all four targets. Such a double operation needed utmost 
precision. Only if they were executed in an identical way was there a chance of success. Since 
the command in Athens knew that there were problems with the refueling of the planes and 
that clouds of dust would be blown into the air whenever planes started or landed, it was 
grossly negligent to adhere to the two waves.  
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 When the transport planes of the first wave returned to the airfields in Greece by noon 
of 20 May, it became apparent that, due to the dust, the schedule for the second wave could 
not be kept. Although this was reported, nobody was ready to order the postponement of the 
dispatch of the second wave, possibly to the next day, or to send the second wave just to 
Maleme, which was demanded by some officers.13 Instead the second wave started in a totally 
uncoordinated manner and with three hours of delay. The first transport planes arrived at 
Rethymnon and Irakleion when the combat planes had to fly back because they ran out of 
fuel. The transport squadrons reached their target areas in total disorder and dropped the 
parachutists piecemeal within a timeframe of more than two hours. As the invaders were not 
supported by combat planes, the defenders could inflict heavy losses on the parachutists. 
Nevertheless, the Germans tried to fulfil their combat mission but in general towards the end 
of the day they had to form hedgehog positions and pass over to defence.  
 The only spot where the parachutists had a chance to take an airfield was at Maleme. 
This meant the defenders had to hold this airfield at any cost and annihilate the aggressors. If 
the defenders succeeded in denying the airfield to the aggressors, the end of Operation 
Mercury would be at hand. But this did not work out because of bad communications between 
the defenders of Height 107 (under Colonel Andrew) and respectively Hargest and Freyberg. 
Andrew had fended off the German attacks on 20 May but his battalion had suffered heavy 
losses. When the promised reinforcements did not arrive, he evacuated Height 107 and 
withdrew to a position further east. It can be argued that he was right in doing so because he 
knew that his battalion would not survive a further attack by combat planes. Later in the night 
parachutists moved uphill and occupied the dominating Height 107.  
 The evacuation of Height 107 by Andrew during the night enabled the conquering of the 
airfield during the following day and the landing of mountain troops (Gebirgsjäger). Even 
one single heavy machine gun on Height 107 could have seriously impeded the landing of Ju 
52 transport planes on Maleme airfield or made it totally impossible. Strictly speaking, the 
battle of Crete was lost during the night of 20 May.  
 On the German side Löhr and Student grasped only in the evening of 20 May that defeat 
was threatened if the airfield was not occupied. This meant a change in the operational 
schedule. This change was initiated by Student who sent the few reserves of the parachutists 
under the command of Colonel Ramcke to Maleme. They cleared their adversaries from the 
airfield until the afternoon of 21 May so that the planes with the Gebirgsjäger could land. But 
in the meantime Student had lost his commanding power.14 From now on General Ringel of 
the Gebirgsjäger was in command and he changed the character of the fighting. While the 
parachutists had attacked frontally from the air by jumping directly into the enemy positions, 
Ringel practised a tactical attack based on outflanking infantry moves. His maxim was ‘sweat 
saves blood’. His troops circumvented the defence positions of the adversary by advancing 
over high mountainous tracks which were not occupied because they were considered 
impassable. Then they attacked from the rear. So once the airfield was under German control 
the situation was saved.  
 But even in the evening of 21 May, after the Gebirgsjäger arrived, Freyberg might have 
turned the tide if he had ordered a counter attack in brigade strength and had insisted on its 
execution. He could have recaptured Height 107 if the attack had been conducted in time and 
with strong enough forces. Instead Freyberg allowed himself to be impressed by the 
pessimistic situation appraisal of Puttick and Hargest and refrained from attacking in great 
strength. Being still afraid of a German seaborne attack he even left his forces guarding the 
sea front. Thus defeat was sure. After the occupation of the Maleme airfield German troops 
and material could be transported to Crete. The character of the fighting changed. The 
mountain troops fought according to infantry rules, i.e. each attack was prepared by artillery 
fire. A little later the British withdrawal began which ended in Sfakia with the evacuation.  
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Reasons for the success of the aggressor  
It is astounding indeed that an aggressor, inferior in numbers, who had only light weapons at 
the beginning, was able to overcome a superior opponent despite the fact that the latter knew 
the plans of the attack and was prepared for it. This can be ascribed to two factors, the first 
being the total German air supremacy above the island and above the sea. The uninterrupted 
air attacks demoralized the defenders. The fight with the Royal Navy was won by the 
Luftwaffe. It was proven that an air force is capable of beating a fleet which has no air cover. 
Anti-aircraft guns do not suffice, especially if the special ammunition runs low, as it did. A 
fleet without air cover is almost defenceless at daytime.  
 The second factor which led to final success was the fundamentally different concept of 
leadership. The armies of Great Britain and the Commonwealth followed the principle of 
order and execution. If there was no order coming from above, even higher officers did not 
move. This system led - in combination with the catastrophic lack of communications - to 
passivity. In contrast to this, the German army had practised mission-type tactics since the 
early-nineteenth-century. Accordingly, all soldiers were educated to autonomous thinking and 
acting. This principle was even mentioned in the so-called ‘ten commandments’ of the 
parachutists: ‘You must fully understand the sense of an operation, so that you can act on your 
own in case your leader dies’. As a result, the lower rank officers and NCOs and even the 
simple parachutists executed their tasks even if the division commander and most of the 
regimental commanders had been killed. They did not wait for orders from Athens. Indeed, 
the battle of Crete was conducted by the lower rank officers, the NCOs and the privates of 
both sides. The battle was lost by the commanders of the New Zealand troops.  
 
The Greek contribution  
So far historiography on the battle of Crete has rather neglected the role of the Greeks. The 
Greek regular army was represented by freshly drafted recruits who had gone through very 
little training, were badly equipped and were lacking of ammunition. Nevertheless, they 
fought splendidly when they were led well. Without their stubborn resistance against the 
Gebirgsjäger southwest and south of Chania, the evacuation road to Sfakia would have been 
blocked and evacuation would have been impossible from there.  
 The Cretan gendarmes who also were combatants proved to be tough fighters, as was 
seen in many places especially south of Kissavos/Kastelli and near Kandanos where they 
killed at least 39 German soldiers in a two-day battle. As many of these gendarmes were not 
Cretans and were part of the Greek Royal Gendarmerie, republican Cretans did not like them 
and in Cretan historiography their contribution to the battle of Crete was minimized or totally 
neglected or attributed exclusively to the Cretan irregulars who had joined them in the fight.  
 During the months preceding the attack the Greek General Staff made an effort to create 
a Cretan militia of 3,000 men which would wear blue berets and armbands, thus making them 
combatants according to the international rules of war. In this militia former soldiers who 
were too old (40-45 years old) for the regular army would serve. They would be under the 
command of the gendarmerie. By February 1941 four battalions with 1500 men had been 
established. The British promised to send weapons but until the German attack nothing 
arrived. Apparently there was little interest in the British Near East command. Probably 
Wavell was not ready to take responsibility for the way these units would fight.15
 
 
 The British preferred irregular warfare. Since June 1940 (i.e. before Greece was in the 
war) SOE agents under the lead of the former archaeologist John Pendlebury were organizing 
the future resistance. In 1929 Arthur Evans, the excavator of Knossos, made Pendlebury 
curator and from 1936 till the war he led the excavations in the Dikti mountains. Pendlebury 
spoke Cretan dialect and knew the island well from his hiking tours. In May 1940 Pendlebury 
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and many other archaeologists who were serving in the Army were transferred to military 
intelligence to organize resistance in Greece. In June 1940, five months before Greece was 
attacked by the Italians, Pendlebury returned to Crete. During the following months he and 
some other SOE members organized resistance groups. Some of these groups contributed to 
the fighting during the German invasion. These groups and others who joined in 
spontaneously did not know the international rules of war and fought in traditional ways. 
After the battle Germans reported that some Cretans had mutilated the corpses of the dead.16  
 Cretan stories say that Pendlebury was executed by the Germans. In reality he was 
already suffering a sepsis when he was shot through the chest in a fight with parachutists. A 
German orderly administered first aid to him (he was wearing a captain’s uniform) and 
brought him to a house. Later a doctor of the parachutists looked at him. During the night he 
died in his bed.17  
 
Conclusions  
The battle of Crete proved that airborne operations made sense. The high losses were the 
results of ULTRA and the miserable reconnaissance of the German side by which the element 
of surprise was lost. If the airborne troops won the battle despite these handicaps, this proves 
the military quality of these troops. On the side of the Allies this was understood and the 
formation of airborne troops was intensified. Hitler arrived at the wrong conclusions when he 
held that the time of airborne operations had come to an end. The German airborne operations 
against the islands of Leros and Kos in autumn of 1943 indicated that operations with precise 
tactical aims could be successful and made sense. However, the Allied attack on Arnhem in 
1944 showed that strategic aims could not be obtained and led to similar losses as in Crete.  
 If conducting a war according to the rules of the Hague Conventions (1899 and 1907) 
and of Geneva Conventions (1864 and 1906) is considered an honourable, ‘clean’ way of 
fighting, the battle of Crete can be characterized as such. Generally the regular troops of both 
sides, including the Greek gendarmerie, adhered to the rules. There were a few exceptions on 
both sides. There are two well known cases, that of Kontomari where a young lieutenant 
indoctrinated by Nazi ideas took his private revenge by massacring the males of that village, 
and the ‘authorized’ (probably by General Ringel) case of Kandanos where the village was 
burned down and four old people were killed because shortly before at least 39 German 
soldiers had been killed by gendarmes and irregulars. On the Allied side the Māori soldiers 
did not always observe the rules of war and the Cretan irregulars, who had not heard of those 
conventions, fought in their traditional way.18 Details are well documented.19
 
 
 
After the war  
Besides the Nuremberg trials, there were other similar war crimes trials in the four German 
occupation zones (American, British, French and Soviet). In May 1945 the British arrested 
Student and brought him to the notorious interrogation centre in Kensington Palace (London 
Cage).20 He was put under duress, the interrogators believing that he was ‘the typical stubborn 
conceited Nazi General’.21 In 1946 Student was brought to a court at Lüneburg in the British 
zone of occupation in Germany to be tried under sentence of death for alleged war crimes 
committed by his troops in Crete. Most of the witnesses for the prosecution were former 
British soldiers, not New Zealanders who had borne the brunt of the fighting. After listening 
to the witnesses for the defence the court dropped most of the charges and when General 
Inglis (a New Zealand Crete veteran) appeared before the court he gave testimony in favour of 
Student. Therefore Student had to be acquitted.22 Additionally, one should not forget that 
Student had been removed from his command from the 21 May 1941 until the end of the 
Cretan campaign. From that day on orders were given by the Commander of Luftflotte 4, 
General Löhr.23 After the end of the trial the British were so convinced of Student’s innocence 
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that they rejected a Greek demand to transfer Student to Athens to stand trial. Student was no 
war criminal.  
 The New Zealanders, who had borne the main weight of the fighting, were of the 
opinion that the battle of Crete had been fought in a tough but fair way. Thus in 1959 the 
Secretary of the New Zealand Crete Veterans Association wrote a letter to Student in which 
he suggested that Student become honorary vice-president of the New Zealand organization 
and that there be mutual honorary membership for the members of the New Zealand and 
German Crete veteran associations. Student accepted and to this day 90 year old parachutists 
proudly show their honorary membership diploma of the New Zealand Crete Veterans 
Association.24
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